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Abstract 
The present study calls for a philosophical analysis of ethical leadership in the academe in light of Levinasian ethical maternity. It 
investigates the intersections between, and the re-conceptualization of, leadership and maternity. This research begins with a 
philosophical analysis of Levinas’ framework of disinterested responsibility, making it the basis of ethical maternity, which is 
then woven into the discussion of ethical leadership. The maternal sacrifice suggests a crucial lesson about educational 
leadership: those whom people place in positions of responsibility in the academe are to approach the task with the single-
minded, wholehearted, ultimate self-sacrifice of a mother. Prenatal experience is restless, painful, vulnerable, open to the 
demands of the other. Academic leaders should wield power in a way that is Levinasian, in a way that is ethical, in a way that is 
maternal.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Certain aspects of Levinas’ writing have opened new questions and concerns for academe with regard to 
educational leadership. The present study calls for a philosophical analysis of ethical leadership in academe in light 
of Levinasian ethical maternity. It investigates the intersections between, and the re-conceptualization of, leadership 
and maternity. This research begins with a philosophical analysis of Levinas’ framework of disinterested 
responsibility, making it the basis of ethical maternity which is then woven into the discussion of ethical leadership. 
The maternal sacrifice suggests a crucial lesson about educational leadership: those whom people place in positions 
of responsibility in academe are to approach the task with the single-minded, wholehearted, ultimate self-sacrifice of 
a mother. Prenatal experience is restless, painful, vulnerable, open to the demands of the Other. Academic leaders 
should wield power in a way that is Levinasian, in a way that is ethical, in a way that is maternal.  
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2. Disinterested Responsibility: Paradigm of the Ethical 
 
Levinas presents a highly original and profound view of the self in relation to Others, causing a sense of 
“disorientation” from the traditional notion of I-You relation. He shows, by his concept of responsibility, that 
responsibility is more basic than my subjectivity and which founds that subjectivity. Levinas speaks of the 
constitution of subjectivity through the approach or coming of the Other – who assigns me to my being me. I do not 
exist as an I prior to my being exposed to the Other.  My subjectivity arises from my being responsible for that 
Other person whom I bear within my very self: it is my – and no one else's – irreplaceable responsibility for it is that 
other person that makes me me (Levinas, 1969). The event of responsibility, for Levinas, imposes an obligation 
upon the subject to serve and to be responsible for the Other, to respond to the Other's demands. Levinas describes 
the event of responsibility as a singular event that happens each time one person comes face-to-face with another 
person. 
The Levinasian perspective on ethics draws the subject out from the interiority that philosophy has 
traditionally posited as the essence of the self, and into the exteriority of responsibility that realizes subjectivity. 
Subjectivity is reinterpreted as essentially for-an-Other rather than for-itself. (Levinas, 1985, 95-96). The epiphany 
of the Face, which bears the idea of Infinity, is the beginning of the transition from a movement from “being-for-
itself” to a “being-for-the-Other”. Surging forth, the face suspends my solipsistic, infantile enjoyment and puts my 
enjoyment of the world into question. By questioning my possession of the world, the Face requires me to establish 
a distance between myself and my elemental existence. The Face addressing me reveals that my domination has 
come to an end. Nothing would ever be the same. I am substantially changed.  For a long time, in Western tradition, 
we live with the insight that being the subject is the ultimate call for us all. It takes the wisdom of Levinas to reflect 
on a paradigm shift, to recognize the truth that there is a call beyond the call to be for-oneself. It is the call to be for-
the-Other. It is the unselfish effort that arouses in me a joy more sublime and pure than the delight of narcissistic 
enjoyment. The approach of the human Other breaks the ego away from its concern for its own existence. One’s 
apprehension of the Other forever trembles on the possibility of novelty, owing to its irreconcilable strangeness and 
its brimming autonomy. 
The kind of ethical relation envisioned by Levinas is not one of mutual obligation and reciprocity or give-
and-take; it is thoroughly asymmetrical as expressed by the height of the Other. The Other has absolute priority over 
the self and imposes on the self an unconditional and absolute, non-negotiable demand. Levinas maintains that the 
ethical relation between the I and the Other must be acknowledged, from the very start, as asymmetrical if it is to 
remain ethical. For Levinas, responsibility demands that I be hostage to the Other. Being hostage, I am obliged to 
open myself to – because opened by – the height and destitution of the Other. To the question, “Why would I feel 
responsible for the Other?” As a hostage, I am not for-myself; I am for-the-Other. Ordered, summoned, commanded 
by the Other, I have to assume all responsibilities incumbent upon me. That is my ownmost responsibility; there’s 
no getting away from it or passing it off to someone else. A responsibility shifted to someone is no longer a 
responsibility. In all of these moments of service to the Other, the I is not awarded a site for itself where it can live; 
rather, the over-exposure to the Other unsettles him more, forcing him to give more, serve more, be hurt more - for 
the Other. This is disinterestedness par excellence. 
 To conclude this entire section, we bring to the fore two vital points in Levinas’s discussion of the demand 
of responsibility: one, responsibility for the Other is dangerous; second, it is disinterested. It is dangerous – in the 
positive sense - because it disturbs my complacency, challenging my deepest biases, leaving me alone groping in the 
dark, finding my way out of them. It is disinterested because it does not carry any heroic accents; it speaks only of 
the unconditionality of being a hostage; it gives until, and even if, it hurts - and despite of itself being denuded - it 
still falls short of being disinterested! 
 
3.  Maternity:  Metaphor for Ethical Responsibility  
 
For Levinas, maternity is the paradigm of disinterested responsibility. Maternity is viewed as the sacrifice 
of the self (mother) for the Other (child), a demonstration of the genuine possibility of one dying for another. In this 
chapter, I demonstrate that this I-Other relation that Levinas has in mind is more effectively conveyed by the 
maternal relationship in which the child dwells in, is connected to, and is nurtured by the mother’s body (Katz, 
2003).  
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In maternity, the mother’s body serves as host to the child by providing a space for the child within her 
own flesh. Maternity is the capacity of making a place for the Other, a space of a relationship to an-Other in me, a 
unique indwelling, an incarnation of the-Other-in-me, in the figure of the maternal body. To deepen the plight of the 
mother, maternity makes the mother a hostage as well. As a hostage, she has no choice; she is passive, and she is 
bound. Ordered, summoned, commanded by the Other (child), the I (mother) has to assume all responsibilities 
incumbent upon her. The mother feels an infinite responsibility, holding her hostage before any choice on her part, 
to that child.  
In pregnancy, the mother bears the child in the flesh, despite the pain that this bearing might bring. The 
child kicks in, alters the mother’s figure, and bothers her immensely. The mother leaves her personal comfort to 
attend to the needs of the child in her womb. Her mind and body are constantly in labor. She reshapes her personal 
orientation in conformity with a higher and nobler cause: the child. She abandons her egoistic, self-obsessed ways, 
transcends her own individual whims and caprices and moves to a meaning ever deeper and far larger than that of 
her selfish, monadic ego. Rather than thinking of herself as an independent and autonomous self, the mother 
wrenches the center of her life outside her interiority, and directs all her being to this child snuggling in her womb. 
If the heroism of the self is to be found anywhere, it is here, in the ultimate audacity to which a mother is assigned. 
And the mother, as a hostage, cannot – and should not – shirk from her responsibilities for maternity entails 
denuding the mother beyond nudity, demanding from her more than she can give. 
To say this is not to create out of motherhood an ideal of moral superiority that neither mothers nor anyone 
else could approach. Levinas does not, for sure, perpetuate the idea that all mothers are somehow superior to non-
mothers, that if you have not borne and raised a child, your capacity for love is somehow diminished, that non-
mothers cannot possibly know what it is to love unconditionally, to be selfless, to put themselves at risk for the 
gravest loss. Rather, it is to find inspiration in what mothers already do, sometimes even in spite of themselves, for 
the articulation of an ethics that remains in the flesh. I interpret this ethical imperative to be like a maternal body as 
something not limited to females. This holds true even for the males and non-parents to be maternalized when the 
Other is encountered. In this sense, maternity does not become a biological or social imperative for women to 
reproduce, but rather an ethical imperative for all of us to bear the stranger as if he were already under my skin, 
gestating in my own flesh (Guenther, 2006). 
Motherhood is a gift of the Other; it is the gift of the child that makes the woman a mother. The gift of birth 
reminds me that birth is not only given to me; it also gives me; bringing me forth into a world in which I have 
always responded to the Other. The mother’s generosity does not belong to her; it arises as a response to the child 
who makes her generosity possible (Guenther, 2006). In her self-gift, a mother feels small and insignificant, but not 
devalued, because her life now has a purpose, to serve the child. It is almost as if you were called to devote your life 
to a little God. This said, Levinas (1981) turns to “maternity,” “the gestation of the other in the same” (p. 75) to 
name the responsibility that captures the ethical. No longer thinking of herself, the mother only thinks of her child. 
Her world becomes the child’s. And it is the same with us all called to universal “motherhood.”  
 Maternity, however, is not a threat to freedom and responsibility, but is their very condition. It exemplifies 
a conception of sacrifice, the giving of oneself to another, that demonstrates a love that is disinterested, and a bond 
"stronger than death." This giving need not always devalue the giver by giving under unfavorable conditions, but is 
to be construed as enhancing the giver precisely through her self-offering.  
Now, there is one issue we have to clarify here. Is it really natural for a mother to sacrifice herself for the 
welfare of her child, to be naturally disinterested? Let me posit answers to these issues while remaining faithful to 
Levinas’ ethical responsibility. We say that motherhood is patient, generous and compassionate. But apparently, this 
seems not always the case. A woman could conceivably abandon her child, and certainly this happens. But when it 
does happen, it nonetheless jars our sensibility, precisely because we understand the depth and strength of the 
mother-child bond. Maternal generosity can spill over into resentment and anger, even to the point of becoming 
violent. Some women who raise children, like anyone else, have moments of intolerance, weariness, distraction, or 
selfishness. For sure, some others are prone to exhibit self-satisfaction and selfishness, who can raise children as 
adjuncts, like rooms added on in a renovation. Their children’s values and achievements in the world are reflected 
glory, necessary for these parents’ ego, and sometimes, for the family’s survival. These moments, however, do not 
indicate a failure of particular mothers to reach the ideal of maternal sacrifice, but rather an affirmation of the 
inherent difficulty of motherhood and the vulnerability and limitation of persons whose responsibility for Others 
seems too much to bear.  
Levinas does not suggest that a woman who does not sacrifice herself for her child is less of a mother and 
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less of an ethical subject, since she cannot be used as a model of a self who becomes fully vulnerable and 
disinterested in relation to her child. Levinas is neither proposing nor demanding that women become mothers or 
sacrifice their lives, nor is he saying that maternity is the only ethical relationship (Katz, 2003). If we can admit, 
with Levinas, that maternity is a good metaphor for ethical responsibility that would demand supreme self-sacrifice 
and self-transformation; it is because experiences like these seem to us more the rule than the exception. If we find it 
hard to admit that maternity as such entails a mother’s vulnerability vis-à-vis a child, then perhaps this is because 
first, some women insist on ethical freedom that Levinas aims to criticize over the course of his philosophizing and 
second, these women are too much dependent on the initiative of an independent and sovereign individual and too 
much divorced from the real experience of human relation.  
A mother’s being and the very meaning of her existence are increasingly defined by her relation to the child 
and her responsibility to him; this metaphor captures the way in which becoming ethical involves the very 
constitution of the self as a vulnerable hostage to the Other. Levinas’ use of the metaphor of maternity is therefore 
successful articulation of his philosophical position on the transcendence of the ethical relationship between self and 
Other. This vulnerability to the Other is the ultimate meaning of our very existence. Nothing more, nothing less, 
nothing else. 
   
4. Educational Leadership as Ethical Maternity 
 
As previously discussed, maternity is the metaphor of ethical responsibility. The mother’s relation with her 
child is disinterested, hostage-like, and asymmetrical. In this section, we interlace ethical maternity with educational 
leadership by unfolding the maternal aspect of leadership underscoring the selflessness of a mother. I will 
demonstrate that academic leadership is maternal in character, having the Other inside me, showing the connection 
between maternity and leadership. The maternal sacrifice suggests a crucial lesson about educational leadership: 
those whom people place in positions of responsibility in the government are to approach the task with the single-
minded, wholehearted, ultimate self-sacrifice of a mother.  Only when leadership is maternal is it truly ethical. 
As maternity is disinterested, so is educational leadership. Leadership is always disinterested because it 
calls upon school leaders to set aside their personal needs. Responsibility for the students means the welcoming of 
inconvenience. For Levinas, my sense of responsibility stems from the way in which I find myself affected by this 
student-Other as uniquely responsible for his singularity. The school leader does not assume leadership as a product 
of balancing the weight of the tasks ahead. 
A school leader is a hostage to the people he serves. Being responsible is about transcending the drive 
toward self-preservation and self-enhancement. Being responsible for the students is about addressing their concrete 
needs without reserve and without concern for one’s own being. If all that the leader wants is self-perpetuation, she 
will undoubtedly fail as a leader and, worst, as subject. The key to effective leadership has very little to do with 
wielding authority and much to do with giving oneself for Others. The genuine academic leader is driven by 
affectionate desire for those in her care. It is a yearning for their welfare, a zeal for their well-being that motivates 
her to give her best for her people – even to the point of giving her life for them, if pushed to its limits.  
School administrators and teachers should help students get on with their lives, overcome personal 
difficulties, and pursue their dreams. Despite having difficult students, the teacher should be there to do what can be 
done to offer her student a future. All "experienced" teachers know that teaching well requires a rapport with 
students that goes beyond transmission of knowledge. It is precisely this sense of "reaching" out to students, feeling 
their needs and concerns, helping them come to grips with themselves - their fears, emotions, and concerns - that 
teachers are held "hostage" by their students.  
Educational leadership is asymmetrical. While pressure is usually put on the people to submit to the leader, 
in Levinasian leadership, pressure is put on educational leaders to be the servants of all. It is a life of sacrifice and 
self-giving, carrying the load for others, ministering to their needs with tenderness, gentleness, and long-suffering.  
The responsibility of a school leader is a one-directional normative relation: my responsibilities as leader of a 
college/university do not require them to have the same, or any, responsibilities for me. Driven by nothing less than 
pure service, the school leader embraces her tasks no matter what happens, wherever it brings her, and whoever 
crosses her path. While they are confronted with these on almost a daily basis – stressed situations, troubled 
students, committee work, submission deadlines, as well as, having to take students’ homework and other paper 
work home – these teachers still have to discharge their duties to their utmost best. True, some of them are 
overworked and underpaid; but this doesn’t give them any reason to perform less, serve less, or do less. Teachers 
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still have to arrive at school early in the morning, long before their classes commence, leave for home hours after the 
end of the school day, help students before and after class, give up their free time for their students as maternally as 
possible, without counting the cost. Giving acquires its highest meaning only when it entails my stripping of what is 
more my own than my possession (Levinas, 1981, p. 56; Lingis, 1986, 219-300).  
What if there is a conflict of interests in academe: teachers against the administrators, students against their 
teachers, or parents against school leaders? Traditionally, not a small amount of power has been bestowed upon the 
educators. Genuine leadership as envisioned by Levinas has very little to do with power and domination. Teachers, 
for example, must admit that true learning ultimately comes from the student. We learn from our students. It is the 
student who knows what disturbs them, what problems are crucial, what pains have been bottled up. For too long, 
pedagogy as a formal system has emphasized that the student adore the teacher as her master. The truth is this: by 
making our students our “puppet”, we disempower them; we annihilate their uniqueness, we do them violence! True 
leadership requires humility, a willingness to listen, to admit that others might know more about a given situation, to 
admit that one might really be mistaken on occasion. A true leader listens more than speaks, whispers more than 
shouts, apologizes more than blames, serves more than commands. Leaders understand that one of their most 
important functions — perhaps the most important — is to push the people to their limits of their potentials, and not 
to exploit those people for their own gain, to make themselves look good, or to advance their own careers. Again, 
that is precisely what a faithful mother does. She is genuinely sacrificial. She is utterly unselfish. She is exceedingly 
generous. She is willing to give anything and everything for that little life. And the baby consumes her thoughts, her 
time, her energy – her very life. 
Isn’t this too much for the school leaders? Indeed it is, but this should not be the reason not to do it or 
abandon it altogether. This ethical relation, apparently ideal in nature, only tells us, “Never say enough.” While 
disinterested responsibility cannot be realized in the present, the ideal itself – precisely because it is unrealizable – 
has enormous pragmatic value to the extent that it serves as the transcendent measuring stick by which to judge our 
distance from the utopia of full ethical relationship. Levinas tries to work his way out of the pessimism intrinsic to 
the nature of responsibility by distinguishing between our living up to the ideal of disinterested responsibility and 
heeding the ideal. While the former is unreachable, the latter is of indispensable importance. Indeed, our awareness 
of the ideal should motivate, rather than distract us, from the fulfilment of what should be. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The application of Levinasian ethical maternity to pedagogical leadership sheds light on the inherent role of 
academic leaders towards their stakeholders. It is said that teachers are students’ second mothers; it is inaccurate. 
There are no second mothers; either you are or you are not.  
This paper examines maternity and leadership simultaneously by bringing the work of Levinas on ethical 
maternity and the ethical leadership in academe into a fecund dialogue. This study thus reveals the following 
outcomes useful in the field of ethical leadership, pedagogy and ethics: first, in our genuine relationship with the 
students, administrative leaders must have a heightened respect and genuine concern for the students whom they 
should bear as their children; second, the ethics of maternity provides an ethical paradigm for genuine leadership 
that serves as the basis for assessing the kind of leadership any future leader of academe wishes to offer the people. 
This paradigm lays down new and positive templates for ethical leadership in academe. I encourage school leaders 
to meditate on this basic fact and to recognize that their highest worth is not to be determined by how much 
knowledge they instill but rather on the impact of their role in the lives of people whom they serve. 
Undoubtedly, the task at hand for educational leaders is at the very least challenging, if not altogether 
overwhelming. Yet, these leaders all draw from maternity not only the complexity and profundity of their great 
responsibility as school leaders but also, and in a great measure, the resiliency and ingenuity of mothers (and 
fathers) in finding innovative ways of dealing with the ever increasing demands of those in under their care. The 
valuable insights that can be gleamed from maternity evoke the humanity in each of us for indeed none but in 
motherhood are we given life and made human. 
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